Northflank Security Incident: Rotate Every Secret You Stored There
Northflank says assume every environment variable stored on its shared control plane was decrypted. What to rotate, and what else to check.
If you store secrets on Northflank, rotate all of them, starting with AI provider keys, cloud keys, database passwords, payment keys and source-control tokens. Northflank's full incident report says an attacker ran code inside one of its API components on October 30, 2026 and took a subset of decrypted customer secrets (Northflank incident report). Northflank has also revoked every Northflank API token, so make a new one if your scripts or CI use one.
What happened?
On October 30, an attacker exploited a previously unknown vulnerability in a Northflank API component and got remote code execution there. That component had access to Northflank's database and to the keys used to decrypt stored secrets.
From 02:41 to 03:08 UTC, the attacker read the encryption keys, queried the database, decrypted stored secrets and uploaded the ones that matched their filters to a server they controlled. Northflank's security alert reached the team at 11:43 UTC, and the vulnerability was fixed at 13:05 UTC, 82 minutes after the alert. Northflank emailed every user that afternoon asking them to treat all secrets as exposed.
Northflank worked with Wiz's incident response team and the forensics firm FTI Consulting on the investigation.
What did the attacker look for?
Northflank captured the attacker's scripts. They kept a secret only if it matched known credential formats (OpenAI, Anthropic and Google AI keys, AWS keys, private keys, Slack tokens, GitHub and GitLab tokens, crypto wallet keys) or had a name pointing at AI providers, cloud access, crypto or general words like secret, token and API key.
Am I affected?
- 1.5% of customer teams had secret values taken, and 1.8% of secret values on the platform were exfiltrated.
- Almost all affected customers lost project secret groups: environment variables and secret files. Global secrets, notification integrations (Slack, Discord, Microsoft Teams) and BYOC cloud integrations that used static credentials were also hit.
- BYOC integrations connected through cross-account or cross-service-account linking store no long-lived key, so no usable credential was taken from them.
- Northflank's status page says forward-deployed and dedicated control planes were not affected.
- Northflank found no evidence that user credentials, customer personal data, Git integrations, services, jobs, add-ons, builds or customer workloads were accessed.
- Reports of misuse so far have all involved AI provider keys.
Northflank still asks every customer to rotate, because it emailed everyone before the scope was known and rotating is the safe default.
What to do now
- Rotate every secret stored in Northflank. Start with AI provider keys like OpenAI and Anthropic, then cloud keys like AWS, database passwords, payment keys and source-control tokens such as GitHub.
- Revoke the old credential at each provider once the new one is in place, then update the secret in Northflank and redeploy.
- Check usage and billing on your AI provider accounts for activity since October 30.
- Create a new Northflank API token if you stored one as a secret. Northflank revoked them all. DevLinksPad's Northflank page links to the tokens page.
- Don't count on deleting a project or team. Northflank points out that deleting it doesn't invalidate keys for outside services, so rotate them at the provider.
- Use the self-service credential rotation Northflank added for database, cache, object storage and message queue add-ons.
- If you stored direct IAM credentials for BYOC, rotate them yourself.
If you found charges you didn't make, contact the API provider's support to ask for a billing review, then email support@northflank.com with audit logs, suspicious IPs and your support case references.
How to cut your exposure next time
Northflank's own suggestions:
- Connect cloud accounts with cross-account or cross-service-account linking instead of long-lived IAM keys.
- Use workload identity to inject short-lived credentials where your provider supports it.
- Restrict third-party API tokens to your egress gateway IPs where the provider allows it.
- Subscribe to status.northflank.com.
Audit logs are now on for all Northflank customers, not just Enterprise, which makes it easier to check your own team's activity.
What is still unknown
Northflank hasn't named the vulnerability. The report says the investigation hasn't found evidence of user credential or personal data theft "at this point in time," so watch the status page for any update.
FAQ
Did someone get into my running apps?
Northflank says there is no evidence of access to customer workloads or workload data.
Why rotate if my team wasn't in the 1.5%?
Northflank asked every customer to rotate before the scope was known, and rotating costs far less than finding out later that a key was taken.
Which keys were most at risk?
AI provider keys. The attacker's filters looked for them by key format and by name, and every misuse report so far has involved them.
Who do I ask for help?
Email support@northflank.com, or use your direct channel with Northflank if you have one.
Rotating a long list of keys is slow. devlinkspad doesn't rotate anything, but it jumps you straight to each provider's API keys page.
Press ⌘K. Every dashboard, one keystroke away.